This study aims to analyse a recent, wide-ranging trend towards the constitutional entrenchment of balanced-budget clauses in national constitutions in the European Union. The article tries to answer this question: is this trend just pointing out the rise and triumph of a substantial approach to public-finance issues in constitutional law? Or is it also announcing a legalisation of financial constitutional law, an area of constitutional law which has traditionally been analysed in the framework of the relationship between the executive and the legislature?
10 See e.g. Élise Barthet, "La Constitution n'a pas à définir le contenu des politiques publiques" (interview with Dominique Rousseau), Le Monde (Paris, 21 May 2010), at http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2010/05/20/deficitil-est-dangereux-d-inscrire-dans-la-constitution-une-obligation-qui-ne-pourra-pas-etre-tenue_1360813_823448.html. 11 According to these provisions, "the budgetary position of the general government of a Contracting Party shall be balanced or in surplus … The rules set out in paragraph 1 shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Parties at the latest one year after the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary process". See also the Euro Plus Pact of March 2011: "Participating Member States commit to translating EU fiscal rules as set out in the Stability and Growth Pact into national legislation. Member States will retain the choice of the specific national legal vehicle to be used, but will make sure that it has a sufficiently strong binding and durable nature (e.g. constitution or framework law)" (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/120296.pdf). 12 In principle, this earlier "golden rule" admitted public debt provided that most of the revenue obtained by means of borrowing be used to finance investments. See Article 115(1) of the German Basic Law, as modified by the Zweiundzwanzigstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes of 12 May 1969: "The borrowing of funds and the assumption of pledges, guarantees or other commitments, as a result of which expenditure may be incurred in future fiscal years, shall require federal legislative authorization indicating, or permitting computation of the maximum amount involved. Revenue obtained by borrowing shall not exceed the total expenditures for investments provided for in the budget; exceptions shall be permissible only to avert a disturbance of the overall economic equilibrium. Details shall be regulated by federal legislation". 13 Law on the Promotion of Stability and Economic Growth (Gesetz zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft of 8 June 1967). 14 Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:306:0041:0047:EN:PDF. It provides (Article 6(1)(b)) for "the effective and timely monitoring of compliance with the rules, based on reliable and independent analysis carried out by independent bodies or bodies endowed with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of the Member States". 15 Fiscal councils are defined as bodies which help reduce the deficit "while leaving full discretion to the political representatives" (Xavier Debrun, David Hauner and Manmohan S. Kumar, "Independent Fiscal Agencies", 23 Journal
It is apposite to embark upon this study bearing in mind the American experience, which offers important evidence concerning the practical operation of constitutional balanced-budget clauses. From this perspective, comparison with the American (federal and state) constitutional experiences may be particularly useful: forty-nine out of fifty states have passed balanced-budget constitutional amendments, and the possible introduction of a balanced-budget clause in the federal Constitution has been the subject of a long-lasting scholarly and political debate. Comparison with the United States is therefore necessary not only because of its relevance to a proper understanding of the dynamics of the European constitution but also because the US is the main stronghold of fiscal constitutionalism and its constitutional practice provides important evidence of the possibility of effective constitutional entrenchment of the principles of fiscal constitutionalism (paragraph 5).
In the end, the results of comparative analysis will be assessed in the light of the current debate about political and legal constitutionalism and their significance to the development of of Economic Surveys (2009), 61). 16 See comprehensive comparative analysis by Federico Fabbrini, "The Fiscal Compact, the 'Golden Rule' and the Paradox of European Federalism" (2012), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2096227. 17 See Valentina Giomi and Fabio Merusi, "Politica economica e monetaria" in Mario P. Chiti and Guido Greco (eds), Trattato di diritto amministrativo europeo. Parte speciale (Milano, Giuffrè, 2007) constitutional law in Europe.
Financial Constitutional Arrangements as Part of the Law of the Constitution
The origins of modern constitutionalism are usually traced back to parliaments struggling with monarchs for control over taxation and public expenditure. English constitutional history provides, of course, the best examples. Thus, the origins of constitutionalism -even before Article XVI of the French Declaration of 1789 was conceived of 18 -are closely related to a seminal version of what contemporary constitutional scholarship frames in terms of financial constitutional law 19 .
Incidentally, these non-revolutionary roots might be a reason to explain why constitutional charters are often quite elusive with regard to public finance as a fundamental part of the fabric of government 20 .
The underlying assumption was that parliaments -the representative organs of the peopleat-large -would have normally opposed the executive's need for money (meaning, in most cases, the military expenditure of monarchical national states in the early Modern Age). As was written, "the executive normally tends to exaggerate the necessity or appropriateness of expenses … whereas legislatures reveal a willingness … to limit the executive action … by preventing or moderating increased expenditures" 21 .
However, there is another founding myth, of equal strength. According to this account, the origins of constitutional law are intimately linked to the rise of judicial review in the United States, and a subsequent wave of judicialization of constitutional questions 22 . Under this perspective, the position of financial constitutional law becomes much more disputable. This is an area of constitutional law where there has traditionally been limited room for judicial review.
How can these two narratives reconcile with each other? Another seminal moment of European constitutional history -the struggle over the Prussian military budget under Bismarck -is even more telling, and allows us to develop a more proper understanding of all the issues involved.
That conflict over budgetary decisions ultimately resulted in (and has been steadily interpreted as) a great compromise between the legislative and the Chancellor. This fundamental moment in
European constitutional history was a landmark in the rise of a German model of "pure" constitutional monarchy 23 . Meanwhile, financial constitutional issues had decisively been attracted towards the area of tension (Spannungsfeld) of the relations between the executive and the legislature. The theoretical outcome of that clash in the 1860s -Paul Laband's conception of budget as a law in formal sense 24 -has left its mark until recently: it is still the case in Germany that public budgets may be reviewed only to a limited extent by the Bundesverfassungsgericht 25 .
Major Aspects of the Recent Reforms
This paragraph will briefly present the most important innovations brought about by recent constitutional amendments in the four most important Member States in the Eurozone and Hungary.
The subsequent paragraph will be devoted to discussing some particular issues in these reforms, notably the conditions and the limits of enforcement by constitutional courts and the possibility of derogations.
All these reforms have been initiated out of concern over the current financial turmoil.
However, their geneses are quite different. The German reform was part of a wider, long-standing debate about the internal balance of German federal order: most of all, it aimed at coping with financial instability in some Länder, the most important manifestation of which was Land Berlin's application for bailout, or, more precisely, for a declaration of budgetary emergency 26 . That is why it was labelled as "Second Reform of Federalism" (Föderalismusreform II). Since then, it has served as a blueprint for reform throughout Europe, both at the national and international level. In Hungary, the drafting of Articles 36 and 37 of the Fundamental Law was part of a controversial process of constitution-making amidst severe political and financial crisis. In Italy and Spain, constitutional amendments were hastily approved in order to face pressure coming from EU 
b. Spain
The German emphasis on stability is hardly shared by the other legal systems I am considering in this article.
Unlike the German Basic Law, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 was more laconic with regard to financial issues. Before 2011, Article 134, the fundamental provision in its "financial Apart from these claims, the important point is that Article 81(4) was not meant to dictate substantial limitations to budgetary processes -rather, its ultimate goal was to limit parliamentary initiatives in the domain of public finance. That might also have contributed to the difficult reviewability of laws involving increased spending before the Constitutional Court: Article 81 played a role in the relationship between political office-holders rather than in the architecture of the legal system as a whole 38 . As said before, it dealt with political goals rather than legal obligations. The current rules on legal standing before the Constitutional Court are problematic because they seem to restrict, to a considerable extent, the reviewability of ordinary state legislation under the new constitutional balanced-budget clause. Furthermore, the Court of Auditors, which in principle is entitled to challenge the legitimacy of financial laws before the Constitutional Court under Article 81, has not been particularly zealous in exercising this power 39 . Subsequent attempts at improving the effectiveness of Article 81 have usually relied on a rationalization of parliamentary 35 Article 81(4) before the latest constitutional reform in April 2012, which did not modify its text. 36 In fact, some of the Italian constituent fathers advocated for the construction of this constitutional provision as a balanced-budget clause. This interpretive approach, however, has never prevailed through the course of Italian constitutional history: see della Cananea (n 20), 93- by the "great" constitutional reform of 2008 43 . On that occasion, another innovation went largely unnoticed: the amended text of Article 34(7) of the Constitution provides that "the multiannual public guidelines for public finances … shall be part of the objective of balanced accounts for public administration". Therefore, a "golden rule" was already present in the constitutional text but was largely unobserved. It remains to specify what it entails.
The following developments can be summarized as a difficult path towards some kind of entrenchment of a règle d'or. The draft constitutional amendment bill initiated in 2011 is based not on a simple balanced-budget rule but on triennial (at least) "frame laws (lois-cadre) for balanced public finance", with compulsory a priori review of frame laws and annual budgetary laws by the
Conseil constitutionnel.
As a result of the election of President Hollande, Article 3(2) TSCG will probably be implemented by means of organic legislation. More properly speaking, the draft organic law finally (4) and (5) shall only be possible during a special legal order, to the extent required for mitigating the consequences of the causes, and if there is a significant and enduring national economic recession, to the extent required for redressing the balance of the national economy" 44 . All these parliamentary activities, however, are subject to the prior consent of a Budget Council which has an ultimately political legitimation and whose duration exceeds that of the legislature (Article 44).
Questionable Features of National Constitutional Reforms in the Eurozone
These recent constitutional reforms are not immune from interpretive and functional problems. With some noteworthy exceptions, they contain a probably dysfunctional blend of legal and economic concepts, and provide detailed regulation of issues which have not a properly constitutional substance: ultimately, they might be regarded as a particular manifestation of a general trend towards a degradation of the quality of constitutional norms 45 . Moreover, financial constitutions were often modified without taking into account their necessary coordination with other "structural" aspects of constitutional orders. In this paragraph, enforceability and derogations will be examined in order to make some points on the magnitude of these transformations.
a) Enforcing Balanced-Budget Clauses
A first issue that one should consider is the actual enforceability of the new constitutional clauses, which is by now (implicitly or not) required by the Fiscal Compact 46 . The new constitutional norms lay down more precise normative frameworks, which legislators are supposed to comply when drafting the annual budget. Thus, the role of those bodies whose primary mission is judicial review of legislation, i.e. constitutional courts, is inevitably addressed. In my opinion, the picture is mixed, and this uncertainty is not merely a result of the inevitable ambiguity of concepts whose defining core lies somewhere between the domains of economics and law.
The "spirit" of the TSCG could prove to be particularly innovative. This is true above all of 44 Magyar Fundamental Law, English translation available at http://www.kormany.hu/download/4/c3/30000/THE%20FUNDAMENTAL%20LAW%20OF%20HUNGARY.pdf. 45 See e.g. Pierre de Montalivet, "La dégradation de la qualité de la norme constitutionnelle sous la Ve République", 119 Revue du droit public et de la science politique (2012), 925. 46 See discussion by Jean-Victor Louis, "Un traité vite fait, bien fait? Le traité du 2 mars 2012 sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance au sein de l'Union économique et monétaire", 48 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (no. 2/2012), 5. What can be said with regard to national constitutional courts?
In the case of Germany, the constitutional parameters of legitimacy look more precise than they used to be before 2009 -thus, their justiciability should "have improved" 49 .html, paragraphs 27: "The Conseil constitutionnel is entrusted with reviewing financial laws, and it will have to exercise such review taking into account the advice of those independent institutions which will have preliminarily been established". 53 Article 37(4) of the Magyar Fundamental Law: "As long as state debt exceeds half of the Gross Domestic Product, the Constitutional Court may, within its competence … only review the Acts on the State Budget and its implementation, the central tax type, duties, pension and healthcare contributions, customs and the central conditions for local taxes for conformity with the Fundamental Law or annul the preceding Acts due to violation of the right to life and human dignity, the right to the protection of personal data, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and with the rights related to Hungarian citizenship".
b) Exception française: A Plausible One?
There is, in fact, a Member State within the EU where constitutional review of financial constitutional law has been in place for many years, and constitutional judges have been developing vast and significant case-law concerning financial issues 54 . These judges even declared the constitutional illegitimacy of a public budget in the late 1970s 55 . Furthermore, in this country the constitutional clause on the limitation of parliamentary profligacy has always been effectively enforced 56 .
However, this exception -France -is a rather complicated one. As far as its genesis, functions, composition and procedural features are concerned, the Conseil constitutionnel has had a unique history among constitutional courts 57 . Moreover, the French Constitution and organic In Germany, for instance, during the elaboration of the "second federal reform" there was some debate about a provision requiring a two-thirds majority of members of the Bundestag in order to recognize an emergency situation allowing for departure from the debt brake 64 -eventually, however, an absolute majority of the Bundestag members (i.e., in most cases, a "Chancellor to regain some ground. An absolute majority is obviously more than a mere plurality, which is the usual quorum required for parliamentary deliberations -still, present-day electoral rules and party systems shape the real meaning of the requirement of an absolute majority in all of these countries.
Furthermore, it is far from self-evident that constitutional courts decide to engage in a difficult, controversial scrutiny of the degree of "extraordinariness" of the economic situation after a parliamentary vote. . If the European Commission, after having given the Contracting Party concerned the opportunity to submit its observations, concludes in its report that such Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3(2), the matter will be brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union by one or more Contracting Parties. Where a Contracting Party considers, independently of the Commission's report, that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3(2), it may also bring the matter to the Court of Justice". If one relies on the preparatory works, a more minimalist interpretation should be correct. 69 It has been observed, however, that the Italian Constitutional Court has a history of effectively implementing (to a certain extent at least) seemingly undetermined constitutional clauses: see Gino Scaccia, "La giustiziabilità della regola del processo di bilancio", 2 Rivista AIC (2012), no. 3, at http://www.rivistaaic.it/articolorivista/la-giustiziabilit-dellaregola-del-pareggio-di-bilancio; Massimo Luciani, national report on Italy (28th International Roundtable on Constitutional Justice, Aix-en-Provence, September 2012 To conclude on this point, flexibility clauses show that there must be some room left for the political branches, at least for the time being.
Lessons from the US
Comparison with the USA constitutional experience is useful because it shows the difficulties of the practical implementation of the principles of fiscal constitutionalism. Reliance on judicial review and distrust towards the mechanisms of representative democracy -at least at the state and municipal level -have a longer-lasting history in the US 71 .
Fiscal constitutionalism has led to subsequent waves of constitutional entrenchment at the state level in the USA. It is therefore possible to draw a distinction between public purpose requirements, limiting the authority of state governments to providing financial assistance to private enterprises and dating back to the pernicious effects of state assistance to private firms in the 1820s and 1830s; debt limitations, among which balanced-budget clauses, which were entrenched as a result of the wave of tax increases adopted to pay off the state debts accumulated during the canal and railroad boom in the very same period; and tax and expenditure limitations, which have been developing since the late 1970s as part of a wider "tax revolt" 72 . Furthermore, courts in the US have been remarkably shy in constructing and enforcing those clauses. There might be three main reasons for this: first, courts tend to treat fiscal limits not as issues of fundamental rights (i.e. "truly" constitutional issues) but, rather, as ordinary legislation.
Secondly, judges, who are often directly elected, might share programmatic orientations with political office-holders (this is a unique American feature, however, which seems unimaginable in Europe) 74 ; and thirdly, courts may be influenced by the degree to which the provisions reflect current political values and enjoy contemporary political support 75 .
All of these circumstances might have contributed to undermining the authority of state constitutions in the US. This is all the more convincing if one considers that the Federal Constitution has very little to say about the financial aspects of constitutional law, except for conferring some powers on the Congress or setting procedural requirements for public expenditure.
The American experience shows that fiscal constitutional provisions raise many important questions. To summarise, a balanced-budget amendment should be enforceable, "it should nevertheless permit carefully delimited degrees of flexibility in its applications" in order to meet possible economic emergency, and it should be politically neutral 76 . The ongoing debate about the financial constitution of the EU can hardly be analysed in the light of the conceptual categories of US fiscal constitutionalism. The quest for financial (and, supposedly, economic and political) stability is much more important to the European debate than Public-Choice-inspired projects of constitutional reform. Fiscal constitutionalism appears to be related to an American line of thought -ultimately arguing for a reduction in the size of government -which cannot be easily recognized in present-day European debates: as it was accurately noted, "simplifying formulas -e.g. 'less government, more market' -are imperfect and elusive syntheses. In fact, the State is replaced by other public powers (the EU, independent authorities) and the diminution of the key role of public powers is fully counterbalanced by 84 See James M. their role as rule-making and monitoring authorities 86 .
Assessing Transformations

b. The Political vs. the Legal
Theories of political constitutionalism -and the political constitution -state that political office-holders "are held to constitutional account through political means, and through political institutions (for example, Parliament)". A legal constitution, on the other hand, "imagines that the principal means, and the principal institution through which the government is held to account is the law and the court-room" 87 . Political constitutionalism defends the democratic process against judicial review "not on the ground that democracy is more important than constitutionalism, rights or the rule of law, but because democracy embodies and upholds these values" 88 . Political constitutionalism can be said to have developed as a democratic reaction against a perceived hyperjudicialization of constitutional issues 89 . Therefore, it tries to rehabilitate the virtues of the political process as a fundamental component of contemporary constitutionalism.
For the purposes of this study, the most evident practical difficulty about political constitutionalism -and its concrete outcomes in the contemporary constitutional landscape -is the actual weakness of contemporary parliaments. Such weakness is particularly serious when it comes to the legislature exercising its scrutiny function vis-à-vis the executive. Concisely speaking, "the political constitution relies on the rigour and vigour of the political process. The more open, transparent, participatory, representative and deliberative politics is, the better the model will work in practice" 90 . However, the rise of strongly centralized executives since the 1980s has led to an apparent marginalization of parliaments 91 . This situation seems particularly serious when it comes to holding the executive to account 92 ; with regard to the legislative function, in turn, the picture might be more nuanced, most of all in non-financial issues 93 .
The importance of this point is particularly striking when financial issues are concerned: as said above, attempted reforms in many countries have tried, not so much to alter the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches (thereby opposing an arguably inevitable trend in favour of the latter), as to strengthen parliamentary oversight in order to obtain healthier public finances and a more transparent and effective implementation of public policies. Nowadays, oversight is supposed to be the main parliamentary activity in semi-presidential systems or those parliamentary systems where the executive can rely on strong and docile majorities 94 On the side of parliaments, the failure of representative legislatures to affirm their role in budgetary matters has been relentlessly observed. In Germany, scholars have claimed that a "deparliamentarisation" (Entparlamentarisierung) of budget is taking place 95 . Discussion of budget plans was said to be a "pointless rite" forty years ago 96 . Recent attempts to reinvigorate parliamentary oversight were apparently unsuccessful in the short term. Legislators in continental
European jurisdictions are not particularly interested in controlling the execution of the budget, due partly to a lack of political incentives 97 . Meanwhile, strong executives have acquired extensive control over the budgetary process.
Thus, the case for a (prevailingly) political understanding of financial constitutional issues might not be so strong as long-standing legal traditions might suggest. So what about a legalization of this part of the law of the constitution? What kind of judicial review will European constitutional courts be willing to perform when dealing with considerably "thicker" financial constitutions?
In the debate about political constitutionalism the greatest emphasis has been placed on judicial review when it assesses the compatibility of legislation with constitutional rights. However, the challenge of legal constitutionalism is not less ambitious when it comes to the review of power-related or "structural" constitutional provisions 98 . Some authors try to engage with this issue by means of a relativization of this (not rigid) 99 summa divisio of constitutional provisions. They claim that some kinds of structural review are distinguishable from rights review and are not susceptible to democracy-based objections. Goldsworthy, for instance, includes among those clauses:
provisions dividing powers within a federation; "manner and form" requirements governing the composition, powers, and procedures of the legislature and its houses; requirements that only independent courts may adjudicate legal disputes concerning the rights and duties of the litigants;
and provisions forbidding states or provinces within a federation from discriminating against the residents or businesses of other states or provinces 100 . What may this mean with regard to constitutional courts in the EMU? One might expect, for instance, that they engage in a stricter scrutiny of constitutional procedural guarantees of the budgetary process than they used to do before 101 . The great question, however, is still how far they will go in reviewing legislation under the new, substance-focused constitutional clauses.
Concluding Remarks
In light of the above discussion, it appears that the current European scene is contradictory and not exempt from paradoxical traits.
First, there is an evident paradox. On the one hand, the German Federal Constitutional Court has been strenuously defending the sovereignty of German constituent power and "the political formation of the economic, cultural and social living conditions" at the national level, among which "fundamental fiscal decisions on public revenue and public expenditure" 102 occupy a central place.
result in their real depoliticization. The answer depends on the cleavage between a political and a legal understanding of constitutionalism, and how deep the shift towards the latter has been so far.
Perhaps the most plausible path of the legalization of financial constitutions is related to the (still vague) emergence of new constitutional goods, e.g. responsibility towards future generations, which lies, almost inevitably, beyond the scope of incumbent representative assemblies (and the executives which they support). In the words of a German Land Constitutional Court which was declaring the illegitimacy of a budgetary law, "citizens and parliaments in the future have to be protected against the risk of losing their necessary possibilities of financial action (according to their criteria) to cope with problems of the day" 107 .
According to constitutional pluralists, there are essentially "three main sources of constitutional and democratic added value" which supranational integration in the EU can bring to national constitutional democracies. Among these, the taking into account of out-of-state interests that may be affected by the national political process (outbounded democratic externalities) and self-imposed external constitutional discipline within national democracies are of the greatest relevance for the purposes of this analysis 108 . They provide an insightful interpreting framework for the negative effects of a Member State's unhealthy financial conduct in the whole Economic and
Monetary Union and the positive interplay of national and supranational constitutional disciplines.
Thus, preservation of the political aspects of financial constitutions in the future might provide the most plausible justification for their actual legalization in the present. It remains for constitutional courts to find out an appropriated balance between these two essential components of constitutionalism when adjudicating cases under the new balanced-budget clauses.
